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On the rhetorical use of almost * 
 
Richard van Gerrevink and Helen de Hoop 
1. Introduction 
 
Consider the following sentence: 
 
(1) Richard almost passed his UG exam, so he will probably get his 
bachelor’s degree by the end of the year. 
 
In sentence (1) the subject technically did not pass his exam. The word almost 
implies that he came close, but failed. Despite this negative result, a positive 
prediction for the rest of his studies is a logical follow-up to this statement (cf. 
Verhagen 2005). This observation forms the basis for this paper. We are 
especially interested in the reasons why people formulate sentences with the 
quantifier almost. In the example sentence it seems as if the first part is a 
statement that is used as an indirect argument for the second part, which in turn 
can be seen as a conclusion. So the fact that Richard almost passed his exam 
supports the conclusion that he will receive his bachelor’s degree by the end of 
the year. In normal everyday language use, however, the argumentation does not 
necessarily have to be as clear and complete as in this example. The following 
sentence was taken randomly from the internet:  
 
(2) Ronaldo almost scored a goal in the remaining ten minutes for AC 
Milan […] Ronaldo clearly got talent, and if he gets himself shaped-up, 
he is going to be an important player in AC Milan… [italics added] 
 
In (2) it is stated that Ronaldo has got talent. The fact that he almost scored a 
goal seems to support this statement.  
In this paper we will start out with a brief sketch of the semantics of almost. 
We will discuss accounts that have been given by Penka (2006) and Nouwen 
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(2006) for the exact meaning of almost. We will see that even though these 
accounts show how one can derive the meaning of almost, the semantics alone 
does not provide a satisfying answer to the question why people would want to 
use this word. After the semantics has been discussed, the focus of this paper will 
shift towards Argumentation Theory. We will discuss the role that almost can 
play in argumentation and we will explain how this actually works from the 
perspective of a speaker with the help of Optimality Theory. As far as we know, 
this is the first time that Optimality Theory is applied to Argumentation Theory 
and Rhetoric. 
  
2. The semantics of almost  
 
In this section we will try to determine the exact meaning of almost, basically 
following Penka (2006) and Nouwen (2006). We will conclude the section with a 
discussion of how this can help us in determining why a language user would 
want to use almost. To begin, take a look at the following sentence pairs: 
 
(3) a. It is six o’clock.   b. It is almost six o’clock. 
(4) a. The victim was dead.  b. The victim was almost dead. 
(5) a. John scored a goal.   b. John almost scored a goal. 
(6) a. Hugh never drives his car. b. Hugh almost never drives his car. 
 
The a-sentences all contain simple statements in which something happens or 
occurs. If we now turn to the b-sentences, one might say that by inserting almost 
the statements of the a-sentences have been negated on a logical level in the b-
sentences. In (3), ‘almost six o’clock’ means that it is not six o’clock (yet); in (4) 
‘almost dead’ means that the victim was not dead (yet); in (5) ‘almost scored a 
goal’ in effect comes down to the fact that John did not score a goal and in (6) 
‘almost never’ means that Hugh does drive his car occasionally. Everything that 
comes to pass in the a-sentences technically does not come to pass in the b-
sentences. However, as the instances of yet in parentheses already indicated, 
almost does entail that the event which it seems to negate is never far away from 
occurring. In formal semantics it is said that the b-sentences constitute worlds 
that are minimally different from the worlds of the a-sentences. If the worlds of 
the b-sentences were to be changed just the tiniest bit, they would be exactly the 
same as the worlds of the a-sentences. 
Penka argues that the semantics for almost is similar to that of other 
operators like only, at least, at most and more than. That is, almost operates on a 
certain scale: 
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A sentence in which almost modifies an expression P entails the truth of 
a corresponding sentence without almost in which P is replaced by a 
value close by, but lower on the scale associated with P. (Penka 2006: 
278) 
 
With an example: 
 
(7) John picked almost 1000 apples yesterday. 
 
Sentence (7) entails that a certain number of apples was picked by John, that 
certain number being close to but lower than 1000. Penka stipulates furthermore 
that the semantics of almost involves alternatives that are ordered on a so-called 
Horn scale. This scale is ordered by the entailment relation in such a way that a 
certain element on the scale entails all the elements that are ranked lower on that 
scale. In Horn (1972) these scales are related to quantifiers as well as scalar 
predicates. An example of such a scale is the following list of quantificational 
elements: one – some/a few – several – many – half – most/the majority – 
all/every. Every item on this list logically entails the items to the left of it. So if it 
is the case that ‘many girls are clever and seductive’, then it is also the case that 
‘some girls are clever and seductive’ (Horn 1972, pp 57-61). Taking all of this 
into consideration, Penka composes the following formula for the semantics of 
almost (Penka 2006: 279): 
 
(8) [[almost]] = w.p<s,t>. ¬p(w) & 
 
q [ q  p & q(w)] 
(The symbol  is used to signify the ‘close-by’ relation.) 
 
The formula in (8) ensures that the proposition almost p is true if and only if p 
itself is false in the actual world, but there is an alternative proposition that is 
close by to p and that is true. The requirement in (8) that p is false ensures that 
only alternatives that are lower on the scale can be true.  
A somewhat less strict definition of the semantics of almost can be found in 
Nouwen (2006). Nouwen makes a distinction between two different approaches 
to the semantic definition of almost: (I) the intensional approach and (II) the 
scalar alternative approach. The latter is the same as Penka’s. The intensional 
approach, however, is defined as follows: 
 
Almost p is true if and only if there is a world which is not very different 
from the actual world in which p is true (Nouwen 2006: 165) 
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At first glance, the intensional approach seems far more difficult to use, because 
it is harder to determine how closely two possible worlds resemble each other, 
than it is to compare two values on a certain scale to each other. Consider for 
example the next sentence, found in an online version of the film script of the 
movie Almost Famous: 
 
(9) She's almost to her bedroom down the hall when mom catches her 
[italics added] 
 
In (9) there is a certain end point, the bedroom, and the proximity to it can be 
easily placed on an imaginary scale. Say that the distance from the front door to 
the bed room door is 15 metres, then according to the scalar alternative approach 
‘almost to her bed room’ would be true once the girl is within a few metres from 
her bed room door. A problem is posed, however, once almost modifies a 
proposition that is not so easily placed on a certain scale. Consider for example 
the next sentence, taken from random Google-searches on instances of almost: 
 
(10) This blog has become almost a diary [italics added] 
 
It is very difficult to imagine a scale of prototypicality for diaries. For such an 
analysis one would like an ordered set of properties of diaries that can define 
measurable exemplars to be placed on a scale. For these cases the intensional 
approach seems better suited. In the intensional approach we can analyze ‘almost 
a diary’ in terms of worlds that have a diary and worlds that have a blog that has 
a lot of the characteristics that we would normally ascribe to diaries, yet not all 
of them. Thus, the set of properties does not have to be ordered because they do 
not have to make up a scale. Even though this approach still requires some 
imaginative power for analyzing almost p, it is still more workable than to try 
and think up a scale for a set of properties that cannot be scalarized easily. 
In this section we have determined the formal meaning of almost. In 
formally defining the meaning of this word, however, we still do not gain any 
insight in the reasons why people would want to use it. The semantics alone does 
not provide any clues. As pointed out in the introduction, propositions containing 
almost can be used as arguments for a certain statement. For instance, a sentence 
such as (5b) above (John almost scored a goal) could be uttered by a speaker to 
convince the hearer of the fact that John is a good striker. The next chapter will 
focus on this use of almost in argumentation. 
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3. The rhetoric of almost  
 
In this section we will investigate the rhetorical effect of almost and explain why 
people would want to use it.  
The basic idea of Argumentation Theory is that the speaker or writer makes 
a certain statement which the hearer or reader will not automatically believe. An 
argumentation in its most basic form consists of two parts: a statement (also 
known as claim or conclusion) and an argument that supports the statement. The 
purpose of the speaker is to convince the hearer of the truth of his statement 
(conclusion). One condition is that the argumentation should be valid, meaning 
that the conclusion has to follow from the arguments (van Eemeren 1996). An 
example of a valid argumentation is of course modus ponens: 
 
(11) Premise 1:   If p is the case then q is the case. 
Premise 2:   p is the case.                                  
 Conclusion: q is the case. 
 
The validity of an argumentation does not guarantee that the argumentation is 
convincing or that the conclusion is true, however. This also depends on other 
factors, such as the truth or plausibility of the premises. In everyday 
argumentation the first premise is often left implicit. Making every premise 
explicit for each argumentation would make everyday language a very tedious 
and lengthy business. This does however cause a problem: what should a hearer 
make of all these incomplete and therefore invalid argumentations? The solution 
is simple: each hearer validates argumentations that lack the first premise 
themselves, making the argumentation sound, without the speaker having to 
make premise 1 explicit each and every time he wants to make his point. 
The possibility to leave this first premise implicit entails that speakers 
assume this premise to be part of the common ground, one that is valid in general 
and that is shared at least by both speaker and hearer. And something that is 
already known by your conversational partner does not necessarily need to be 
spoken out loud. Another argumentative element that can be left implicit is the 
conclusion. In fact, leaving the conclusion implicit can be an effective tool in 
Rhetoric: when a hearer draws the intended conclusion by himself, this is often 
more convincing than when the speaker explicitly states the conclusion. So, a 
speaker might leave the general premise 1 (pq) implicit as well as the 
conclusion q. Yet, on the basis of the given argument p the hearer might still 
come to the conclusion q, which is exactly the purpose of the speaker, who wants 
to convince the hearer of q. 
We will now determine what kind of effect an instance of almost has on a 
sentence and how this can be interpreted in the context of an argumentation. If 
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we now take a look at sentences that contain almost in the context of an 
argumentation we get an argumentative scheme that can be interpreted as a 
modified version of a modus ponens. The second premise is not p, but almost p, 
yet it still leads to the conclusion q, given pq. 
 
(12) Premise 1:  (If somebody scores a goal, he is a good striker.) 
 Premise 2:  John almost scored a goal.                                     
 Conclusion: (John is a good striker.) 
 
The parentheses indicate that these parts of the argumentation are left implicit. 
The formulation of the argumentation is now less strict and a bit more suggestive 
than a formulation without almost. When almost is used in an argumentative 
context the rhetorical effect of almost is the following. The speaker wants to 
convince the hearer of a certain conclusion q. As long as the speaker can make 
use of premises that are true in the real world, there is no problem whatsoever. A 
problem arises once p is not true in the real world, while at the same time the 
speaker wants the hearer to come to conclusion q on the basis of pq. Were the 
speaker still to present p as a valid argument, he would be lying. This is of 
course not a preferable situation, since a lie is usually easy to detect and will not 
only result in the hearer not coming to the desired conclusion, it will even cause 
distrust in the hearer towards the speaker. The speaker also wants to keep his 
argumentation as valid as possible. If the argumentation is invalid, it is not 
logical for a hearer to come to the desired conclusion. So in the context of our 
problem, stating the truth (namely that p is not the case), will definitely not lead 
the hearer to conclusion q. The best solution to the problem of the speaker is to 
bend the truth in his advantage by stating almost p. Even though p is not the 
case, the speaker creates the illusion that it ís the case, therefore leading the 
hearer to conclude that q is the case. 
So in effect, almost helps in directing the interpretation of the hearer 
towards a certain conclusion that is not supported by reality. This conclusion can 
be left implicit.  
Of course, the reason for a speaker to say almost can also be of a mere 
economic nature, since almost has vague reference, which makes it, for instance, 
far more efficient to say “This blog has become almost a diary” than “This blog 
has taken on a lot of properties that diaries have as well, yet it is still a blog”. As 
we have seen in Section 2, as hearers we are able to think up two comparable 
worlds, one in which an object has all the specific characteristics of a diary, and 
one in which an object which has all but some of the specific characteristics of a 
diary (cf. Nouwen 2006). This last world is the world of ‘almost a diary’. 
Let us now return to the use of almost in argumentation and the reasons for 
people to use almost. It can sometimes be better for a speaker to say almost p, 
On the rhetorical use of almost 7 
 
than just plainly state q even when q is what the speaker actually would like to 
tell the hearer. To illustrate this point, take a look at the following example, 
which is a pretty transparent yet popular advertising strategy (the example is 
taken from the internet): 
 
(13) Premise 1: (If you can drive a car for free, then you should buy it.) 
Premise 2: Drive a (Nearly) New Car for (Almost) Free!                
Conclusion: (You should buy this car.) 
 
If an advertiser uses only premise 2 (and leaves the first premise and the 
conclusion implicit) as a slogan, a hearer will be easily led to draw his own 
conclusions. He is provided with a tempting argument for buying the car 
 
4. An Optimality Theoretic account 
 
In the previous section we have seen that in an argumentative context, a 
formulation with almost can help to convince a hearer of a statement q, which is 
not supported by a real fact p, but only by almost p. We will now look more 
closely at this rhetorical use of almost. We will discuss the different options that 
a speaker has in argumentation and we will see how he comes to an output 
containing almost. The speaker’s perspective will be analysed within an 
Optimality Theoretic framework. 
Optimality Theory (OT) explains language phenomena in terms of violable 
constraints. These constraints express general statements with respect to 
language and they can be in conflict with each other. The constraints are ordered 
in a constraint hierarchy on the basis of their strength. Constraints that are higher 
in the hierarchy should be satisfied more than constraints that are lower in the 
hierarchy. OT specifies the relation between the input and output. For each input, 
several possible output candidates are evaluated against the constraints. The 
output that satisfies the ranked constraints best emerges as the optimal output for 
the given input (Prince and Smolensky 2004). OT has been used first in the field 
of phonology and has later been applied to syntax and pragmatics/semantics as 
well. To the best of our knowledge, OT has not been applied to the field of 
Argumentation Theory or Rhetoric before.  
In an Optimality Theoretic account of Rhetoric, the input is made up of the 
intention of the speaker to convince the hearer of a certain conclusion, given a 
certain situation in the real world. For instance, if a speaker wants to convince a 
hearer of the fact that John is a good striker, then the fact that John scored a goal 
would be a good argument in favour of this conclusion. However, if John did not 
score a goal, then the conclusion that John is a good striker is not supported by 
reality. The candidates in an Optimality Theoretic account of Rhetoric are made 
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up of possible arguments that should lead the hearer to come to the speaker’s 
intended conclusion. In our example of John being a good striker, (relevant) 
possible candidates that the speaker may utter would be “John scored a goal”, 
“John did not score a goal”, or “John almost scored a goal”. Let us now see how 
an OT analysis of Rhetoric works in practice. 
In Section 3 we have already pointed out the problem that arises in 
argumentation once there is a premise 2 that is not true in the real world, while at 
the same time the speaker still wants his hearer to come to conclusion q. The 
speaker does not want to lie, yet he still wants to keep as close to a valid 
argumentation as possible. In this situation there are several possible arguments 
that the speaker can put forward in order to try and convince the hearer of a 
certain conclusion. These statements and their consequences are summed up 
below: 
 
(14) Stating p: You are lying, but the hearer will conclude q. 
(15) Stating not p: You are telling the truth, but the hearer will not conclude 
q. 
(16) Stating almost p: You are not lying, and the hearer will conclude q. 
(17) Stating q: You are not lying, but the hearer will not be convinced of q, 
because you have not provided him with a proper argument. 
 
These options for the speaker are the possible output candidates, which are 
evaluated against the following set of constraints: 
 
(18) *LIE: Speak the truth. 
(19) GIVE-ARG: Provide an argument for the conclusion. 
(20) EFCY: Be as efficient as possible in your argumentation; do not use 
more argumentative elements than needed. 
(21) EXPL: Be explicit in your argumentation; do not beat around the bush. 
 
If we now put the possible outputs that a speaker has for his argumentation in an 
OT tableau against the constraints, we get the following result for almost: 
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Tableau 1 
Input: intention to convince hearer of 
q; given that p is not true, that p is 
almost true and that pq all hold in 
the real world 
*LIE GIVE-ARG EFCY EXPL 
p *!   * 
not p  *!  * 
 almost p    * 
q  *!  * 
almost p, so q   *!  
 
Under this ranking of the constraints, given the input, stating “almost p” is the 
optimal output for a speaker to convince the hearer of q. Just uttering “p” is 
rejected, because this violates the highest ranked constraint *LIE. Saying “not p” 
and stating “q” are rejected, because both outputs violate GIVE-ARG as they do 
not provide the hearer with a proper argument in favour of the conclusion q. Our 
optimal output, saying “almost p”, comes forward as the best option. In this 
tableau a fifth option stating “almost p, so q” is considered as well, yet this one is 
less optimal than “almost p”, because it is a less efficient argumentation: more 
argumentative elements are being used than should be needed to convince a 
hearer. Even though this last candidate output is more explicit than “almost p”, it 
is still rejected because it violates a higher ranked constraint (EFCY) more often 
than the optimal output. 
If we now try to apply this to the next sentence, found in a random Google 
search on instances of almost: 
 
(22) Good performance and almost no downtime. [Said in an advertisement 
for a certain web-server.] 
 
The part almost no downtime can be analysed in an argumentative context as 
follows: 
 
(23) Premise 1:  (If the server has no downtime, it is a good server.) 
Premise 2:  The server has almost no downtime.                         
 Conclusion: (It is a good server.) 
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Tableau 2 
Input: Convince hearer that the server is 
good; given that the server does have 
downtime, but not a lot and given that if 
a server has no downtime, it is good 
*LIE GIVE-
ARG 
EFCY EXPL 
The server has no downtime *!   * 
The server has downtime  *!  * 
 The server has almost no 
downtime 
   * 
The server is good  *!  * 
The server has almost no downtime, so it 
must be a good one 
  *!  
 
Clearly, given that the input is in accordance with reality, the first candidate does 
not reflect the reality, so it is a lie. The second candidate will not convince the 
hearer to buy or use the server: it gives the feeling that the server is down more 
often than not. Candidate 4 makes you think “what makes this server that good 
then?” and simply does not provide enough information. Candidate 5 is a bit of a 
lengthy formulation, compared to candidate 3, the optimal one. This optimal 
output allows the hearer to draw his conclusions on his own, which is always 
better than being force-fed a certain conclusion. 
We have seen how speakers arrive at a formulation with almost in order to 
support a particular line of argument. With the help of Optimality Theory we 
have explained how a formulation with almost surfaces as the optimal form for 
convincing a hearer of a certain conclusion. Even though the focus initially lies 
on the production of utterances containing almost, our solution can be placed in a 
broader perspective. The speaker does not only optimize the production of a 
sentence, in effect he optimizes his entire argumentation strategy. Given a 
situation where reality does not support a certain point he wants to make, the 
speaker can use a formulation with almost to make a statement that twists reality 
in such a way that it does support the conclusion. Out of several possible 
formulations to convince the hearer of a certain conclusion, a formulation with 
almost comes out as the optimal candidate. 
 
5. An extension to the rhetorical use of barely 
 
Our analysis can be extended to the use of barely in Rhetoric. Although the 
semantics of barely has been studied less than almost, it has a similar 
argumentative effect as almost. In the case of argumentations that contain an 
instance of barely the first part of premise 1 is again not true in the real world, 
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therefore there is no solid argument for the hearer to come to the conclusion not 
q. The problem for the speaker however, is that he does want to convince the 
hearer of not q for whatever reason. Suppose that a speaker wishes to convince 
the hearer of the fact that John is a bad striker. However, John did score a goal. 
The problem that the speaker is confronted with is similar to the problem with 
almost. For example, if the speaker would state that John did not score a goal, he 
would be lying. Were he to state that John did score a goal, the hearer will not 
conclude that John is a bad striker, so the best solution to the speaker’s problem 
is to state that John barely scored a goal. The speaker does tell the truth in a way, 
yet the hearer can still conclude that John is a bad striker. 
So, like almost, barely helps in directing the hearer towards a certain 
conclusion that is not supported by reality. Again, this conclusion can be left 
implicit. For the sake of completeness an example of the OT analysis of an 
argumentation with barely: 
 
Tableau 3 
Input: Convince hearer that John is a bad 
striker; given that John scored a goal, but 
some people called it luck, and given that 
if a striker does not score a goal, he is a 
bad striker. 
*LIE GIVE-
ARG 
EFCY EXPL 
John scored a goal  *!  * 
John did not score a goal *!   * 
 John barely scored a goal    * 
John is a bad striker  *!  * 
John barely scored a goal,  
so he is a bad striker 
  *!  
 
Two ‘real’ illustrations of this type of argumentation are the following, taken 
from the internet:  
  
(24) The US have never won in Mexico, and barely scored a goal for the first 
time on Mexican soil in many years. You're seriously underrating 
Mexico [italics added] 
(25)  Terrible game! You barely scored a goal! [italics added] 
 
In (24) the speaker wishes to convince the hearer that he is seriously 
underestimating Mexico and one of the arguments provided to support this 
statement is that the US barely scored a goal (the other argument is that the US 
never won in Mexico). In (25) the statement (conclusion) is that it was a terrible 
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game, and the argument in favor of that conclusion is that “you barely scored a 
goal”. Both argumentations are in accordance with our analysis.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have examined the use of almost (and barely) in Rhetoric. We 
have seen that especially in those cases where a proposition p leads to conclusion 
q and proposition p is not (entirely) true in the real world, a speaker can use a 
formulation with almost to try and convince the hearer still that conclusion q is 
the case, without having to tell a lie. We have seen that from a speaker’s 
perspective, there are several constraints (*LIE, GIVE-ARG, EFCY and EXPL) that 
work together in determining which formulation helps the speaker best in 
achieving his goal of convincing the hearer of a certain conclusion. Formulations 
with almost surfaced as the optimal output for achieving the speaker’s goal. 
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